Documents released by the Assassination Records Review Board show that the planned phased withdrawal of American Forces from Vietnam by
President Kennedy was REAL and indicate that the plan was REVERSED
immediately after JFK's assassination.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcr5Q2RfhSQ

http://www.youtube.com/GJJdude

>Documents released by the Assassination Records Review Board
>show that the planned phased withdrawal of American Forces
>from Vietnam by
>President Kennedy was REAL and indicate that the plan was
>REVERSED
>immediately after JFK's assassination.
>
>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcr5Q2RfhSQ
>
>
>

Gil,

You may be interested, however, that in some quarters the posthumous assassination of JFK continues.
Wonder how The New York Times goes about determining "All The News That's Fit to Print".

Then again, who needs newspapers anymore anyway.



From the 9/17/08 edition of The New York Times,

MOVIE REVIEW | 'VIRTUAL J F K.: VIETNAM IF KENNEDY HAD LIVED'
How One President Might Have Altered a War
By MANOHLA DARGIS

The title of the documentary “Virtual J F K.: Vietnam If Kennedy Had Lived” pretty much says it all, though the movie itself says not nearly enough. Directed by Koji Masutani, this speculative, provocative, frustrating and finally unpersuasive historical gloss races quickly and all too lightly over the major political crises that John F. Kennedy faced during his aborted presidency — Laos, Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam — in what may be the most aggressive big-screen shine job since Oliver Stone’s much derided 1991 hagiography, “J F K.”

. . .

Virtual histories may be swell parlor games (What if Hitler had been a talented artist?), but from the evidence here they can be irritatingly reductive. The current fascination with Kennedy is a curious cultural phenomenon — the Barack Obama campaign being the most obvious echo — and it’s probable that the filmmakers believe that they’re digging deep rather than skimming a trend. But their counterfactuals are no match for the facts of the Kennedy presidency, including the buildup of military advisers in South Vietnam to 16,000 from under 1,000. No less than Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. wrote of Kennedy: “Though he privately thought the United States ‘overcommitted’ in Southeast Asia, he permitted the commitment to grow. It was the fatal error of his presidency.”

For the full review, see

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/movies/17jfk.html?_r=1


By the way, “Hagiography” according to Wikipedia, refers to the “study of saints”.


Incidentally, " the current fascination with Kennedy " seemed to begin before Obama stepped to the forefront :

http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1057

The documents are what the documents are.

The only speculation that remains is from those who contend that JFK would have stayed in Vietnam.


Would JFK Have Pulled Out of Vietnam ? ( 2 Parts)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PhLlOiWvvXo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UN6r7MTTf9Y

Tip O'Neill: JFK was pulling out
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3Icbzk8mg8

ARRB: JFK Phased Pullout was real
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcr5Q2RfhSQ

Kennedy discounts immediate and total withdrawal in Cronkite interview
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uG7jjF6xuKM

Kennedy the Peacemaker
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xh2bv4jRomw

http://www.youtube.com/GJJdude

The book Virtual JFK which the film was based on is a much more thorough and convincing document of JFK's "what-if" history. It essentially records a retreat of historians and former JFK associates who review all the primary documents and known sources (it was gathered for them by the book's authors) and then they debate whether JFK would have withdrawn. Some of the debaters worked in the JFK administration, while others have strong backgrounds in historical research. It is about as thorough and academic as a "virtual history" experiment could possibly be, and I recommend it to any fan of JFK. It both debunks the assumption that withdrawal was guaranteed, while suggesting that JFK's history, records and personal recollections suggest he would have followed through on gradual withdrawal plans following his tentative re-election. Anybody curious on these matters simply must read this book, especially since many of the experts who argue in the book came into the issue certain that JFK would have withdrawn.
Furthermore it is relevant to the assassination by proving that historical issues are never simplistic, black and white matters, but rather complex, multifaceted events which may have well turned out one way or another. While I believe that JFK certainly rubbed a lot of dangerous people and organizations the wrong way, since I don't believe his withdrawal was guaranteed (I don't think he knew for sure) I can't believe his death was directly or solely because of it. Rather, what I believe is that his attitude towards a variety of military crisis (Bay of Pigs, Cuban Missile Crisis, Laos and Vietnam) created a climate of discontent among men trained and prone towards violent solutions, whether it be Lee Oswald or Cubans or whatever, and this triggered his death.
I think the sad thing is great books like Virtual JFK (and the film of the same name) will never get a fair shake among historians and mainstream media because it relies more on theory than evidence. That being said even when documents and eye witness statements croborate theory (such as JFK may have likely withdrawn from Vietnam) the media even then wont acknowledge it. It kinda sucks...

JFK's Cabinet met in Honolulu on November 20th to iron out the details of US policy toward Vietnam, now that Diem and Nhu had been assassinated. This was spelled out in National Security Action Memorandum #273, which was signed by Lyndon Johnson on November 26th. The 10-point, 2000-word document is virtually identical, word for word, with JFK's last such memorandum, NSAM #263, with one poignant exception.
Paragraph 7 of NSAM #263 reads, in full: "With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a whole new level of effectiveness in this field of action."
Paragraph 7 of NSAM #273 was amended to read, in full: "Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as:
A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam;
B. The plausibility of denial;
C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation;
D. Other international reaction.
Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher authority."

This was the blueprint for beginning covert actions against North Vietnam. It was written for JFK, like NSAM #263, by McGeorge Bundy. It was based on Op-Plan 34-A, which had been secretly drawn up that summer by the Pacific military headquarters in Honolulu. These had been approved by JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor on September 9th.
But there is no evidence JFK was ever informed about them. It is an historical unknown. And with his death it will be forever unknown whether he would have authorized NSAM #273, and begun carrying the war north.
Taylor would wield enormous leverage with NSAM #273, telling the Pentagon on January 22, 1964, that it "makes clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory... To do this, we must prepare for whatever level of activity is required." His memo to LBJ the same day recommended "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets, using US resources under Vietnamese cover."
(Deep Politics, pp. 25-37)
Conveniently, the minutes to the secret CINPAC meeting in Honolulu that had initiated the covert war planning were "routinely destroyed". Conveniently, the massive compilation of "Pentagon Papers" of McNamara's then-secret task group (to study the history of US involvement in Vietnam) would have a seven-week gap, beginning on the eve of the Diem coup, October 30th, and extending to December 21st.

Surely, if there had been any indication that JFK was in favor of bringing the war into North Vietnam, it would have been saved.

Under Op-Plan 34-A, on the night of July 30th, 1964, South Vietnamese patrol boats shelled two suspected infiltration bases off the coast of North Vietnam, located on islands in the Gulf of Tonkin. Surveying the sea nearby were two American destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy. Under the NSA's Operation DeSoto, the destroyers had been sending patrol boats to collect radio and radar signals from China and North Vietnam.
Two nights later an allegedly enraged North Vietnamese skipper singlehandedly launched a hare-brained attack upon the destroyers, acting without orders, mobilizing a handful of PT boats. (NY Times Magazine, 8/10/97) They cruised 60 miles out to sea and sprayed automatic weapons fire around the Maddox. It suffered no damage or casualties but sank two of the torpedo boats and left a third dead in the water.
The United States protested the attack to North Vietnam. Naval air and sea patrols were beefed up and ships were ordered to destroy any subsequent attackers. Newly-appointed ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor, cabled Washington, saying failure to respond to the "unprovoked attack" would show "that the US flinches from direct confrontation with the North Vietnamese."
On August 4th a hoax attack on the destroyers was created in order to justify retaliatory bombing uponNorth Vietnam, and the first landing of Marines in the South. It was the hoax that began the Vietnam War.
The NSA transmitted intercepts to the Maddox and Turner Joy, warning that an undetermined number of PT boats were mustering another attack. It was a pitch-black night in rough seas. In the adverse weather, sailors' imaginations ran wild at their battle stations. Freak radar echoes became PT boats or "unidentified prop aircraft"; sonar traces became the wake of torpedoes; distant whitecaps became cockpit lights. One intercepted North Vietnmese message indicated that two PT boats had been "sacrificed". But the NSA intercept was actualy two days old. (America's Longest War, pp. 120-121)
The NSA hoax had been designed to be sprung once North Vietnam overtly reacted to the covert operations being waged against it. NSA's Deputy Director Dr. Louis W. Tordella acknowledged many years later that the August 4th intercepts and warnings were phony. (Body of Secrets, p. 299)
The phantom enemy engaged the American destroyers for three hours. Their commanders flashed back more than 20 cables to Honolulu and Washington. The Joint Chiefs demanded the US must "clobber" the attackers. McNamara outlined for LBJ a series of retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese oil depots, rail bridges and patrol boat bases, but he wanted to make "damned sure that the attacks had taken place." LBJ said he wanted a "firm, swift retaliatory strike."
McNamara became convinced after discussing the evidence with Admiral Ulysses Sharp, the commander of the Pacific Fleet. Sharp said he was certain because of the intercepts and cables (including a "visual sighting" that was later retracted by the captain of the Maddox). Meantime, McNamara discovered to his dismay that word of the second "deliberate attack" had already been leaked to the news services.
Before the high-pressure afternoon in Washington was over, the Joint Chiefs had ordered the execution of the retaliatory air strike; LBJ authorized it at an NSC meeting an hour later; Dean Rusk beat the war drums by calling "the unprovoked attack on the high seas... an act of war." Robert F. Kennedy was not in attendance. (Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, pp. 493-500)
LBJ went on television the next night and told the American people, "We seek no wider war." The next morning he addressed the Congress, requesting a joint resolution "to take all necessary steps, including the use of force" to assist South Vietnam "in defense of its freedom... The government of North Vietnam is today flouting the will of the world for peace." After listening to McNamara testify about "unequivocable proof" of the second attack, the House and Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 414-0 and 88-2. It was a good day for the military-industrial complex.

Although I don't posses the sheer multitude of reference documents to support my belief, I would argue that JFK's presidency was, like most politicians, riddled with inconsistences. However what we do know is that JFK saw fit to authorize initial plans for a withdrawal (263) following re-election, and this is very significant. Though much of this was based on the theory that South Vietnam would be able to take care of itself, JFK also showed a clear inclination towards pessimism over the use of American military force and strategy. Unlike say George W. Bush who's administration likewise drew up withdrawal plans throughout the Iraq war yet it remains an ongoing conflict, JFK, prior to NSAM 263, had a history of repeatedly trying to politically outmaneuver his opponents rather than bomb them to hell. He bounced from one military crisis to another in the short time he was President, and in each case we have recordings and eye witness statements that lend weight to the theory that JFK would never have escalated things to such disastrous levels as Vietnam reached under LBJ and Nixon. If this were so one might argue the Bay of Pigs, or the Cuban missile crisis or even Laos would have turned out much, much differently. Does this mean Vietnam was the same as these aforementioned events? No, it was, in large part, a war created by the JFK administration that grew quickly over time into a American-run overt hot war. But, since we will never know the true answer to this we either take JFK as a leader who throughout his presidency strove to avoid open, massive conflict and bloodshed, or a easily pressured dupe who dug his own grave by entering into Vietnam in the first place. Again, Virtual JFK does a fine job of citing White House tapes in which JFK clearly recognizes the growing trap that Vietnam is becoming, and the necessity for him to get out of it following his re-election and before things turn into the type of war he spent the previous three years trying to avoid. I think that JFK could have withdrawn after re-election with his public support and charm, whereas LBJ could not. I think JFK could have continued covert-ops and supplying South Vietnam with military advisor's without it escalating to 1965 levels or higher. And I most certainly think, as did Robert McNamara, that regardless of whether full withdrawal was in '64-65 or towards the end of his second term, that things would never have turned into the level of troops seen at the height of the American presence under LBJ and Nixon. JFK was no peace loving hippie, but he also wasn't a fool who would buckle to public and peer pressure.

I don't agree that JFK was not peace loving....


He resisted the use of military force at the Bay of Pigs

He supported a diplomatic solution for a neutral LAOS

He started a phased withdrawal from Vietnam

He resisted pressure to knock down the Berlin Wall

He resisted retaliating against the missile site that downed Maj. Anderson during the missile crisis.

He signed the Test Ban Treaty with the Russians

He was pursuing rapproachment with Cuba


JFK: THE PEACEMAKER

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xh2bv4jRomw

http://www.youtube.com/GJJdude

>
>JFK: THE PEACEMAKER
>
>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xh2bv4jRomw
>


For the full article,
www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/booktalk/stories/s1264900.htm


At the Chicago Humanities Festival, Richard Parker, the biographer of the American economist John Kenneth Galbraith, talks about Galbraith's efforts, as President Kennedy's closest adviser, to avert the Vietnam War

. . .

Richard Parker: In the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, an invasion plan that had been inherited from the previous administration and about which Kennedy from the beginning had had the most serious doubts, the young president found himself that summer caught up in the Berlin crisis, and found himself forced to answer Nikita Khrushchev with placement of the United States on a permanent military alert.

Throughout that first spring and summer, Galbraith had watched the dangers the young president faced as they unfolded and had been appalled by the pressures Kennedy’s Washington aides in Cabinet were placing on him to answer force with force, and their seeming eager willingness to escalate both the risks of nuclear and non-nuclear war alike. Galbraith had eloquently warned Kennedy in private against undertaking the invasion of Cuba that spring. Kennedy heard Galbraith’s warnings as well as those of Senator Fulbright and a few others, but it had been drawn along—by a combination of his aides’ pressures and his own inexperience—into a half-hearted support of the invasion. In the wake of his failure he was deeply angry—furious, in fact—at the advice that he had gotten, though the evidence is that his anger did little to deter those members of the permanent government.

. . .


Over the summer, Galbraith had meanwhile sent Kennedy a torrent of letters and telegrams sharing his own much more skeptical thoughts on Vietnam as it became apparent to him that in both the State Department and the Pentagon there was increasing enthusiasm for intervention. As he told Kennedy, fundamental American values were at stake here; it was not a question of using the toys. 'All of us', he wrote the president, 'have been reared with the same instincts more or less, that we as Americans should combine courage with compassion, suspect pompous or heroic stances, respect our capacity to negotiate, refuse to be pushed, and most important of all, seek solutions and social stability rather than military prowess.' He then went on to warn Kennedy of what he saw as a profoundly dangerous trend in post World War II America, a warning which may bear our careful attention today.

. . .

Then, in a paragraph that can only chill the heart of most Americans who lived through the 1960s, he told the young president, 'Although at times I have been rather worried about Berlin. I have always had the feeling that it could be worked out. I have continued to worry far, far more about South Vietnam. This is more complex, far less controllable, far more varied than your advisers allow, far more susceptible to misunderstanding, and to make matters worse, I have no real confidence in the sophistication or political judgment of our own people.'

This was advice that Kennedy was getting from almost no one else in his administration.

. . .


What we can learn from this is that Kennedy, probably via the British ambassador who was a personal friend, learned of what was going on and was furious. At the next meeting, according to the notes of the meeting, ‘the president expressed the fear of becoming involved simultaneously on two fronts on opposite sides of the world. He questioned the wisdom of involvement in Vietnam since the basis thereof is not completely clear. By comparison, he noted that Korea was a case of clear aggression which was opposed by the United States and other members of the United Nations. The conflict in Vietnam is more obscure and less flagrant.’

Kennedy, in short, like Galbraith, wanted no war in Vietnam. To further make his point, just as Galbraith had recommended, Kennedy immediately thereafter reshuffled the state department, moving Galbraith’s two friends, Avril Harriman and George Ball, into senior positions; Avril Harriman as Assistant Secretary for the Far East, and George Ball as Undersecretary. But as Galbraith wrote in his diary hearing the news, to his great dismay, although he realized why Kennedy did this, Kennedy had not replaced Rusk at State, McNamara at Defence, or Bundy himself at the NSC. Into his diary he worried that this would leave the door open which both he and Kennedy wanted closed.

Two years to the day after that announced reshuffle, President Kennedy was dead. But during those two years, he and Galbraith had kept fighting to keep the United States out of Vietnam. In the spring of 1963, Galbraith laid out a detailed strategy for Kennedy for negotiation in Geneva with the Russians, designed to secure a neutralized Vietnam. Kennedy was so impressed that he ordered the state department to open those negotiations. But as records now show, the state department simply ignored him and filed away the president’s instruction. By the spring of 1963, a year later, Kennedy, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, was so profoundly sobered, not only by the risks of Vietnam but of nuclear war, that first he crafted his famous American university speech with Galbraith’s help; the one that called for nuclear disarmament and called for a cessation of nuclear testing by both the United States and the Soviets. Second, most extraordinarily, he asked John Kenneth Galbraith to become our ambassador to Moscow. Galbraith, after much consideration however, declined, realizing that as long as Rusk served as Secretary of State, his ability to act in Moscow, even at the president’s behest, would be limited, and so he instead returned to Harvard.

Thank you, Gil for all your diligent work on your many videos and commentaries on the subject of JFK's murder.

However, in regard to whether JFK could have brought any or all of our troops out of Vietnam thereby saving what turned out to be hundreds of thousands of lives, the fact is that we will never know the answer to that question.

How effectively or for how long could JFK have resisted the pressure that would have been applied by the Military industrial complex and their pentagon allies to escalate that conflict is a matter of pure speculation. What we do know is that all efforts towards downscaling the war or finding a diplomatic solution ceased after the assassinatuion.

The video referenced below spells out in clear detail from several of JFK's speeches the overiding thrust of his policies, not only in regard to Vietnam, but his domestically as well, and make clear the exact reasons that the national war-making apparatus could not allow his presidency to continue. The pursuit of Peace was not on the agenda.

At about 4:40 into this video Jfk emphatically states: "That isn't what the Constitution says!......Harry Truman once said there are 14 or 15 million Americans who have the resources to have their representatives in Washington to protect their interests. And that the interests of the great mass of the other people, 150 or 160 million, is the responsibility of the President of the United States."

How dare he say that, what affrontery! Who did he think he was? President of the United States or something?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJrFpGYgMlE

Jim Ostrowski

PS
The "conspiracy" to cover it all up went kind of like this:

LBJ:
Let's not make a federal case out of it!

Hoover:
Right, boss! The last thing we we need is a rash of investigations!

LBJ:
Boy you got that right!

or words to that effect